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ABOUT THE IPTS REPORT
be IPIS Report uas launcbed in December 1995, on tbe request and under the aupica of
Commissioner Creson. Vbal seemzd lihc a daunting cballenge in late 1995, now appears in retrofuct
as a crucial galuaniw of the IPIS' eneryies and skilb.
Tlte R@ort has publi^sbed articles in numerous areas, maintaining a rougb bahnce behteen tbem, and
*ploiting interdisciplinarit! aslar as possibb. Artict$ are deemed proEectiuel! releuant if tbey atternpt n
qlore iss,es not yet on the policyrwker's agmda (but proiecud to fu tbere sooror or later), or
und,erappreciated agts of i,ssues already on tbe policynaher's agmda. The long drafiing and redrafiing
frocess, based on a serles of interactiue consultations witb oubide *perts, guarantees quality control.
Tbe fi*, and possibly most stgniftcant indlcator of success is tbat tbe Report is being read. Issue 00
(December 1999 had a print run of 2000 copia, in wbat seenwd an optin$ic projection at tbe time. Since
tbm, circulation bas been boosted to 7000 copies. Reqtrcstsforsubscripttons baae come not onlyfrom uariaus
parts of Europe but alsofrom tbe US, Japan" Australia, Latin America, N. Afica, etc.
Tlte laurels tbe pu.blicatian is reaping are rmd.ering it attractiae lor authorc from outside tbe Commission.
We baue alrea.dy publisbed contributiarc by autbonfrom such renowrwd institutiora as tbe Dutcb TNO, tbe
Gennen WI, the ltalian ENE4 and tbe IJS Council olsffatElic and Internat:ional Studies.
Moreoue4 tbe IPIS formally colhboratq on tbe productian of tbe IYIS Rqort witb a group of prestigious
htroryan institutiaw, witb wbom tbe IPN hasformed tbe Euro@an Scimce and Technohglt Obseruatory
(NIO), 6n importalt part of tbe remit of tbe IPIS. Tbe IPTS Rqort i.s tbe most uisibtc manifatatian of tbis
colhboratian.
Tbe R@ort is produced sinultancously tn four hnguaga (Englbb, Frencb, German and Spanish) 4) tbe
IPIS; to tbqe one could add tbe ltalian translat'bn wlunteqed bJ) EI,IM yet anotber sign of the Report's
increasing uisibititl. Tbelact tbat tt ts not only auailable in seueral tanguag*, htt atso largely prqared and
produced on tbe Inter'ltet Vorld Wide We\ makes it quite an uncornrnon und.etaking.
We shall continue to mdeawur to fi,nd tbe bat way of fulfilling tbe @ectatians of our quite diuet
read.enbip, auoiding ouetsimpltfrcation, as well as encyclnpredic reulmts and tbe inaccustbility of academic
journnb. Tlte key ls n remind ounelua, as well as tbe read.e6, tb6t we cannot be all tbings to all ppte, tbat
it is important to carue oul our nicbe and contirutB optini,lt! xploring and uplatting it, hoping to
illumirwte topict undq a nat, ranallng ttgbt for tbe bewfit of tbe readets, in order to prqare tben for
rnanaging tbe cballenga abead.
-JJ-JJJ
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Prefnce
utb ffirt it alrea?y being ma?e in Europe towar?a a bigber
e/ficizncy of our pro?trctbn dyttem an? t/ee uae of chaner
tec/anobgizt. Howeuec tbere it a growing awarenedJ not only anwng
auant-gar?e thinkerd but al^do among the general putrlic tbat tbue
trua.rured by tbemtelvu will not bring ut onto a duttainable patle o/
?evetopmznt, Irwtea?, we ne0 to fin? wayt to traruform the economic
activititt /rom tbe current lzvela of m"aterinb ute an? environmzntal
impart an? to alrure a htglt ?egree o/ inwlvemznt in tbil Proceld
by tlee citizcn.
Tbe ?evelopmznt o/ information an? communication tecbnologizd, an?
tbe emzrgence o/ new mn?eb o/ economic activity in tlee in/ormation
docizty prou?e opportunitica to organizz dociety in a way tbat improved
material ute, an? to dtimulate participatory action by cirircnt.
Tbit growing avarenerd it reflzcffi abo in tbe way tleat reaearcb
agen?at an? topict are prioritizz? by tbe Commitaiory modt recently in
tbe Fift/a Framzwork Programmz /or Rcdearcb an? Developmznt. Tlae
general policizt for tlait programnu base aimzO at intprouing tbe
bau of European competitivenua witbin a perdpective o/ auatainablz
?evelopment. Suttainablc ?evelopment it a multi-/acete? target -
?eve lop mz n t d /a o ul7 b e d ut tainab Ic eco no mical ly, d oc ial$t, c ulturally,
at pell at ecotogically.
Redearcb on du.atainablc ?euelopmznt can take mnny forma. One of tlae
topird in t/ae Fiftb Framework Programmz ?eab witb teating a uler-
/rirn?ty information docizty. A uitical atpect in tbfu regar? i^d
.JJ-J.J-J
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conr)ergence - tbe mzrging o/ 
^"Aio, communbationa an? computera
t/aroug/e ?igital tecbnologitt, Convergence operu up a bodt o/ poddibilitizt
in w/ai.cb mcAia an? urvbed are recomtrine? an? reinventel, o/frri"g
proapecta for truly uter-centric communiration tbat utilizz materiald
an? energy in increa^tingly auttainablc waya. Reaearcb on the
informatbn ncicty witbin tbe Fiftb Framepor/c Programmz /or
R 8 D aimt at the ?evelopmznt of auth conuerging tec/tnologizt,
in/rattructured, rcrvi.cet an? applicatbna tlaat will contri"bute to tbe
?evelopmznt of ?ecentralize? an? in?ivhualkc? actiuitied opening up
ne{u perupectivea for all citizcna.
Tlae Fiftb Framzpork Programmr/or R 6 D il an ffir to tbe acizntific
community to contribute to a duttainable Europe for ut all.
J,J,J'.J
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6 Protectln0 Blotechnology from Blologlcal Weapons
r' Negotiations are currently underway to define a regime to eliminate the belligerent use of
biotechnologies. The design of the protocol is made particularly sensitive by the need to
promote the peaceful use of these technologies and protect the secrecy of investment
intensive research.
Information and communication Technology
12 Content vs. Dlstrlbuflon: Th€ Medlum loses to th€ Message
,: One of the features of the Multimedia Information Societv is likely to be a shift in relative
strength in favour of the content providers, although the owners of distribution networks may
seek to improve their prospects by alliances and consolidation.
Innovation and Technology Poli.y
The manag€ment of Intellectual Prop€rty In Publlcly Fund€d Research
In the cunent context in which private companies are increasingly involved in basic research,
and more tangible performance is demanded of public research organizations, an intellectual
property framework is needed that fosters commercial applications of research whilst
ensuring the dissemination that is essential when a public investment has been made.
Methods
2, Soclal Technology Foreslght: The Cas€ of Gen€tlc Engln€erlng
iri'
:' Opposition to genetically modified organisms has revealed the need for early debate when
developing technologies to identify and avoid factors likely to provoke public resistance and
Social Technology Foresight is a possible mechanism for achieving this.
Regional Development
,2 T€chnology as a K€y Factor for Employment and Reglonal Development
,' A pilot study in decentralized management of EU regional development funds has shown
how using a local operating agent can help overcome the baniers which often prevent SMEs
from accessing subsidies they need to upgrade their technology and remain competitive.
ERRATUM
Due to various technical as well as processing/publishing failures the map included in issue 25 {page 5) was of poor
qualiry, and used borders and shadings which could be read to (mis)convey erroneous information; we apologise for
any misunderstanding.
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Dimitris Kvriakou
J n debates regarding pollution and the
I nossible role of government and government
I intervention, the economic notion ofI externalities is bound to appear. This concept
refers to consequences of actions taken by
economic agents which do not accrue to the
agents themselves, but to others, or often, to
society as a whole (or a suitably defined
geographic subset). Externalities may be positive
(the impact of a scientific discovery allowing
innovation, growth, etc.) or negative (e.g.
pollution in a river downstream by a factory
discharging waste upstream). Since these external
costs/benefits do not accrue to the instigating
agent, the lafter does not have the incentive to
modulate them in accordance to society's
preferences (i.e. more of them, in case they are
positive, or less, in case they are negative).
One solution, the standard one, to this
discrepancy between private and social
preferences, is to impose taxes/subsidies to bring
individual preferences in line with social ones. A
less obvious one, dating from the early sixties,
dubbed the Coase theorem after its inventor, was
largely responsible for getting Ronald Coase the
Nobel award in Economics, in the early nineties.
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Since externalities are often invoked (in their
positive guise in innovation debates, or their
negative one in environment debates) it
may be worthwhile to understand what the
Coase theorem says.
The Coase theorem has been deservedly
hailed as the critical breakthrough in the process
of adoption of economic efficiency arguments in
the resolution of legal issues, and in correcting
externalities. Since externalities constitute one of
the broadest and most visible areas of market
failures, which, in their turn, are the only cases in
neoclassical economics in which government
intervention is justified on grounds of efficiency,
the implications of the theorem extend beyond
legal issues into politics, the role of the state and
the nature of social organizations.
The Coase theorem states that for two
economic agents A, B when A's actions generate
a negative externality for B, and transaction costs
are zero for both parties, it is optimal in terms of
social welfare to allow the two agents to
negotiate a payment to resolve the issue - either
through A's compensating B for the damage A's
activity inflicts upon B, or through B's
compensating A for the benefits A will forego by
discontinu ing the activity.
No.26
J,J,J,JJ
@ IPTS - JRC - Seville. 1998
No.26 Julv 1998
Moreover, and quite crucially, whereas if
transaction costs are zero the social welfare is
invariant to the properg rights allocation - which
would dictate who compensates whom - in the
case of positive transaction costs, the theorem
states that optimality would dictate the allocation
of the property right to the side with the higher
transaction costs.
This is the key issue: allocation of property
rights. The standard solution (often associated
with the British economist Pigou) faces two sorts
The IPTS Reoort
of problems: the tax-imposer must overcome both
the calculational difficulties in estimating the cost
of the externality, and the political obstacles to
imposing a correcting tax. The Coase approach
relieves the authorities of the computational
problem. The political one however still remains,
only this time in the form of assigning property
rights to the side with the highest transaction costs
(which may not be necessarily the politically most
expedient one). Which goes to show that it is not
easy to disentangle the invisible hand of the
market from the hidden fist of the state.
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International controls
on weapons of Mass
Destruction have been
growing since the
1960s, and since the
end of the cold war
attention has shifted
from nuclear weapons
to chemical and
biological technologies
No.26 July 1998
Protecting Biotechnology from
Biological Weapons
J, P. Perrv Robinson. SPRU
lssue: Much biotechnology is as applicable to biological weapons as lt is to more
beneficial proclucts and is therefore causing mounting concern both Inside and outside
government regarding blologlcal-weapons terrorlsm ancl proliferation. Thus, on 4 March
1998, the Council of the European Union acloptecl Common Position No 98/197ICFSP,
which requlres Member States actlvely to promote conclusion of the current
negotlatlons in Gen€va, whlch alm to strengthen the suppresslon of blologlcal weapons,
by the end of 1998.
Relevance: The Industry itself is a useful source of advlce on the necessary controls, but
It has not yet become sufflciently hvolved in the present Intergovernmental
negotlatlons. These negotlatlons, wlll succeecl only lf controls are placed on
blotechnology-based lndustry. But, unless approprlatelv deslgned, such controls could
damage bona fide inclustry and harm the future clevelopment of blotechnology.
|ntrodudion 'proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction
constitutes a threat to international peace and
security'. Those last six words meant that
collective military action against proliferators
could now be justified under Chapter Vll of the
UN Charter. The declaration went on to commit
members of the Council to 'working to prevent the
spread of technology related to the research for or
production of such weapons and to take
appropriate action to that end'.
A process was thus set in motion which will
increasingly affect the context of policy for science
and technology. The first really concrete
manifestation of this process happened in April
1997, when the Chemical Weapons Convention of
1993 entered into force. To oversee this elaborate
J,JJJJ
O IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1998
eapons of mass destruction (WMD),
meaning nuclear, rad iological, chemical
or biological weapons, draw from
technologies whose extreme potential
harmfulness if so exploited necessitates their
control, even suppression. International controls
on WMD have been growing since the 1960s
when the nuclear-weapons Non-Proliferation
Treaty, for example, was concluded, but, with the
ending of the cold war, the growth and :;pread
of WMD-applicable technologies have been
generating demand for much more control. When
the United Nations Security Council nret in
summit session on 31 January 1992,|he assembled
heads of state or government declared that the
No.26 July 1998
disarmament-cum-antiproliferation treaty, now
signed by 168 nations, nearly 500 international
civil servants staffthe headquarters, in The Hague,
of a new Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons. A further major step towards
tighter WMD controls has been under negotiation
between governments since 1995: international
action against biological weapons. The objective
is a Protocol to the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention which will transform that norm-setting
declaration into a suppressive regime akin to the
Chemical Weapons Convention. In January
'1998 President Clinton's administraton finally
announced a US position for this negotiation.
Earlier (and subsequent) EU initiatives may now
come to something. The Council was acting in
consonance with the UN Security Council summit
declaration on proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Yet that new Common Position stands
in contrast to the current EU policy of promoting a
European biotechnology i ndustry. The negotiation
will also require reconciliation with the existing
EU regulation on exports of dual-use goods.
The Problem of Dual Use
The chief obstacle is that the particular
technologies to be controlled are often as
applicable to benign peaceful activities as they
are to WMD. Their outright suppression is
therefore unthinkable, and even lesser means of
control could prove harmful to worthwhile
industry, and to broader society. The duality is
especially evident in the case of biological
weapons, for their production rests on adaptation
of industrial fermentation methods that are used
throughout biotechnology-based industry. As
more commercial purposes come to be served by
the growing of micro-organisms under precisely
regulated conditions, so could the industry
become increasingly problematic for WMD
control and, perhaps, increasingly vulnerable to
it. This is so for the sectors in which the micro-
-J',J,J,J
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organisms themselves are the product, as with
bacterial or viral vaccines, or in the sectors where
chemicals are produced by the micro-organisms,
as in the case of antibiotics, enzymes or yet other
chemicals produced by means of such enzymes.
The vaccine sector could in principle be diverted
to production of, say, plague or Ebola weapons;
the chemicals sector, could be adapted, for
example, to the production of toxin weapons.
Industrial use of genetically modified organisms is
extending both the product and the processing
range, thereby increasing the control challenge.
It hardly needs saying that the biotechnologies
are supporting a socially beneficial, rapidly
growing, investment- rich, wealth-creating and
therefore enormously competitive industry.
Europe, where in 1996 the industry was valued at
40,000 MECU, is struggling against US dominance
of the biotech market. lt is a science-intensive
struggle, especially (but not exclusively) in the
pharmaceutical sector. Firms belonging to the
trade association Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) are estimated
to have spent $18.9 billion on research and
development, more than double what they had
spent in 1990. PhRMA reports, too, that US
pharmaceutical manufacturers now put 19.4
percent of sales into R&D, as compared with 3.8
percent across all industries. One reason is that a
medicinal drug entering the marketplace today
will have cost $350-500 million to develop and
satisfy US regulatory requirements, an investment
that will have been initiated 12-15 vears
previously. Only about one in five novel drugs
recoup their R&D investment. WMD controls
could in principle threaten the competitiveness of
individual companies if they came to be applied
unevenly across the global biotech industry and
marketplace. Industry spokespersons have also
expressed fears that, by offering cover for industrial
espionage or by otherwise compromising the
privacy of commercial proprietary information
The IPTS Report
The issue is
complicated by
the fact that many
technologies, particularly
biotechnologies, have
both military and non-
military uses, thus
making a complete
ban unthinkable
The technology needed
to produce biological
weapons is basically the
same as that used to
produce vaccines and
similar dualities exist in
the chemicals industry
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69 Inspectron regimes face
the problem of how to
ensure the secrecy
needed by the
biochemicals industry
in order to recoup the
ever Increasrng
investment needed
for new product
development
The Chemical Weapons
Convention has three
main elements
Firstly, it is not based
on a particular list of
goods, but focuses on
the use to which any
goods are put; this
accommodates dua
use and means that
technological change
will not render the
frF2f\/ nhcalafa!, vvet vvJv,vuv
SecondlV, the burden
of monitoring is placed
upon the national
authorities who must
make periodic reports
(CPl), WMD controls could have a particularly
negative impact on companies that have invr:sted
heavily in R&D. Yet just as the industry might be
damaged by WMD controls, so also might it be
damaged if the public came to regard it as a
dangerously accessible repository of biolo6;ical-
warfare capability. The dependence of the lraqi
government's biological- weapons programne on
Western exporters is now widely known. So also is
the fact that its principal anthrax-weapon fa<Iory,
at Al Hakam, masqueraded as a civil biotech
facility before the United Nations razed it to the
ground. Other examples may be drawn fronr the
Cold War years. Demand for controls is novr too
strong to be disregarded. The important.thing is to
ensure that any harm they may bring to the
industry is minimal, but without at the same time
rendering them useless.
The Chemical weapons Convention
solution
The problem is how to tread the fine line
between retaining the benefits of biotechnology
whilst suppressing their possible belligerent .rses.
The Chemical Weaoons Convention sets out how
its negotiators thought it could be done for dual-
use chemistry. Analysis of what the Convention
orovides shows it to be a mechanism with three
main elements, as follows.
First, the technologies to be controlled have
been defined in terms of the purposes to which
they are put, not in terms of their inhr:rent
characteristics. ln contrast to the EU Regulation
on Dual-Use Coods, the Chemical Weapons
Convention is not directed only against listed
items. Thus, a chemical weapon within the
meaning of the Convention is not simply a bomb
filled with nerve gas or anything else that a
military person would necessarily recognize as a
chemical weapon. lt is instead any chemical that
is toxic, or from which a toxic chemical can be
No.26 July 1998
made, of a type or in a quantity that has no
justification for purposes not prohibited under the
Convention, namely'industrial, agricultural,
research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
peaceful purposes'as well as certain other
purposes which the Convention also lists. Besides
accommodating dual use, that general purpose
criterion also means that technological change
will not render the treaty obsolete.
The second element follows from the focus on
purpose. Ascertaining intent requires inhusive
investigation: a degree of access to the facilities
and books of dual{echnology users liable to make
them nervous for the security of their CPl. The
Convention therefore places the primary burden
of compliance monitoring on the 'national
authorities' which each state party is required to
establish 'in order to fulfil its obligations' under
the treaty. The chemical industry is accustomed to
governmental inspection and was considered
likely to have confidence in the integrity of
governmental inspectors. In order to ensure that
each national authority is in constant close
contact with dual-technology users, the
Convention requires the national authorities to
transmit to The Hague periodical returns of
detailed information collected from their
industries. And it requires each state party to enact
penal legislation to ensure that its industrial
corporations, and all other natural and legal
persons under its jurisdiction, are in proper
compliance: that they will cooperate, in other
words, with the national authorities in the
discharge of the latter's implementation duties,
however intrusive they may have to be. Some
states' parties have made special arrangements for
ensuring that their legislatures also play a role in
these delicate arrangements
The third element is an international
inspectorate required and empowered to validate
information about dual-technology utilization
.JJJ.JJ
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to the Hague
No.26 Julv 1998
declared to it by the national authorities in
accordance with the terms of the treaty. On-site
inspection of industrial facilities is the primary
instrument. The inspectorate operates under
very closely regulated conditions designed to
safeguard all confidential business information
that it acquires. The implicit function of the
inspectorate and its headquarters staff in The
Hague is of course to keep the national authorities
mindful of their duties. And the national
authorities themselves are, in effect, inspectors of
the inspectorate.
The Biological Protocol
It cannot yet be said that the international
controls on dual-use chemical WMD technology
are fully functional. The current work on
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention
is still at an early, formative stage. The focus
everywhere is on the most obvious task, the
routine insoections of declared facilities. These
are merely an ancillary part of the overall dual-
technology controls, but it is essential that they be
got right in order to build confidence in the total
treaty regime. Presumably the proper balance will
be achieved in the end, and the national
authorities will then be able to perform their
duties to the full. The routine international
inspection of industrial sites should then appear
less menacing than it does now to the
biotechnology-based industries that could be
most affected by the projected biological
Protocol. Negotiation of the Protocol is
proceeding, as did the Chemical Weapons
Convention, through a 'rolling text'. This is still in
a preliminary state, but it is hard to see how
governments that have accepted the principle of
the three dual-use control elements under the
Chemical Weapons Convention could ultimately
come to exclude that principle from the biological
Protocol. lt is good to see that the recently
announced US position does not point in that
J,JJ,JJ
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direction. Exclusion therefore seems an unlikely
outcome, so what now needs to be examined is
whether the final fine print of the Protocol is likely
to provide sufficient control 
- 
that it will not be
merely a token political agreement.
Two criteria of success may be posited from
the special standpoint of dual-technology
control. First, would whatever is finally
agreed commit states parties to national
implementation measures strong enough to
preclude the supply of any export market that
might exist in goods destined for development
or production of biological weapons? In other
words, would the Protocol increase the
protection of individual companies against the
subterfuges and blandishments that have
allowed certain countries to import Western
products for biological-weapons purposes?
Second, would the information-declaration and
international-inspection regime of the Protocol
be likely to deter those who might otherwise
seek to exploit for biological-weapons purposes
the more obviously exploitable parts of
biotechnology-based industries. Would it, in
other words, force cheaters out of industry and
into the'black', where they would then
become more conspicuous to national-security
intelligence measures and liable, then,
to attract challenge inspection? The necessary
mechanism is a set of rules and orocedures that
operate to increase the transparency of activities
involving key dual technologies.
lmpacts on Industry
A biological Protocol that satisfied those two
criteria could thereby bring benefits of great
value to the biotech industry. Voices from within
the industry have, however, drawn attention
to countervailing costs: of having to collect
information for the national authorities; of
having to prepare facilities to receive inspectors;
The IPTS Report
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The third element
is an international
inspectorate required
and empowered to
validate information
about dual-technology
utilization
International controls
on WMD technology
arefar from being
fully functional, and
the details of the
inspection regime have
to be designed in a wav
that builds overall
confidence
To be successful the
contfols need to be
able to prevent rogue
governments from
being able to obtain
the materials they neeo
to produce their own
weapons, and they
also need to be
able to validate the
information supplied to
a sufficient degree to
detect cheating
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The biotechnologt
industry ir.on..rnud
about the cost of
inf ormation collection.
inspections, disruptions
and above all the threat
to the securiW of their
proprietarV information
The industry needs to
be actively engaged in
the process of
designing the regime
in order for its fears
regarding CPlto be
assuaged
The dangers for the
industrv if the protocol
negotiations fail are
also great. Controls
would probably
tighten and scientific
cooperation would be
undermined by the lack
of safeguards against
abuse, not to mention
the impact on the
industry's public image
of accepting possible disruptions to production-
schedules necessitated by inspections; and the
possible loss of CPl. The last of these costs is
sometimes portrayed as intolerably high, despite
the high level of inspection to which parts of the
industry are already subject under health and
safety legislation and under regulations for the
licensing of medicines and other such products.
Biotechnological processing often involves
unpatented trade secrets. In parts of the
pharmaceutical industry, a single microbe could
be a prize of great worth to competitors. A
genetically modified organism used in the
United States for commercial production of
insulin has been valued at more than a billion
dollars. Public disclosure of stolen research
information could preclude as-yet-unsought
patent protection, meaning loss also of
intellectual property rights. Investment in this
sector of manufacturing industry can thus be
seen as altogether more vulnerable than in the
rest of the chemicals industrv.
Thanks to the active involvement of people
from industry in the negotiation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, that treaty makes massive
provision for the protection of CPl. The
inclusion of similar provisions in the biological
Protocol, plus detailed industry attention to the
sampling rights of international inspectors and
to their permitted equipments and on-site
behaviour, could minimize this set of costs. The
task ahead is therefore to negotiate the
stringency of such security measures up to the
point where the residual risks from inspections
would be an insignificant augmentation of
the risks which the industry already I'aces
today. These, it should be noted, are not
small: according to one US authority, the
annual sales for pharmaceutical proclucts
compromised by detected instances of
corporate espionage over the past several vears
exceed three billion dollars.
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The process of detailed consultation between
government and industry has been slow to get
under way in most of the countries negotiating
the Protocol. However, in January 1998 the UK
government reported the successful trial
inspection under the projected Protocol of a
large private-sector pharmaceutical research
facility. The report concluded that'the company
protected CPI throughout the visit: at no
time did it come close to losing control of
CPI'. Similar experience gained during the
negotiation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention shows how valuable such trials can
be in engaging the industry constructively and
in counteracting misperceptions of entailed
dangers. Beyond all that, the industry is also
confronted by the possible costs of the Protocol
negotiation ultimately failing. Such costs could
become severe if the industry itself were
perceived, even incorrectly, to have stood in the
way of international agreement. Failure in the
negotiation would probably bring about a
tightening and extending of those export
controls on the industry that are currently
harmonized by the Australia Croup in its
assigned task of inhibiting proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons. There would
be pressure to bring on the many other
controls mandated by the Chemical Weapons
Convention that are not in fact being
implemented in the biotechnology-based part of
the chemicals industry. Failure could also
weaken the industry's science base. Scientists
could become reluctant to cooperate with
particular firms or to pursue particular lines of
research in the absence of safeguards against
abuse. The industry would have more difficulty
in projecting a reassuring or attractive image of
itself. Even now there is, in the words of a recent
study, 'significant unease about the technology
as a whole, and about potential implications of
its trajectories'; pharmaceuticals are one thing,
it seems, but genetically modified foodstuffs
-J .J ,J ,J -J
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quite another. Were biological WMD actually to
be used, these backlashes against the industry
would be sudden and intense.
Conclusions
The present drive for controls on technology
applicable to biological WMD could impact
adversely on biotechnology- based industry if the
Ceneva negotiators were to produce a poorly
crafted biological Protocol. The impact could be
no less severe if the neeotiation were to fail. Either
way the industry needs to prepare itself. The costs
of inadequate preparation could reach beyond
industry into society as a whole. lt was possible to
conclude the Chemical Weapons Convention
because key chemicals-industry CEOs had come
together and decided, in the mid-l980s, that both
the indirstry and the public interest stood to
benefit from the then-projected treaty, even if it
were to place CPI in some jeopardy. Nothing like
that has yet happened for the projected biological
Protocol. lt should; and the European Commission
can play a role in stimulating 'tt. 5
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Although distributors
of information used to
have the upper hand ..
lssue: Contlnulng technologlcal Innovatlon and llberallzatlon drlves have caused a
reductlon in dlstrlbutors' expected proflt margins, and increasingly lmprovlng prospects
for content provlclers (and packagers).
Relevance: The repercussions for pollcy of the dual prognosls stated above are
substantlal: content ls at present still a small part of the telecommunlcatlons market, but
It may well reap the llon's share in the future. On the other hand dlstributors (many of
them publlc telephony operators) wlll need to adjust to leaner tlmes - though not
necessarily as desperately lean as some scenarlos present them.
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Distribution: The Medium
Message
Content vs.
loses to the
Dimitris Kvriakou, IPTS
echnology and liberalization are reducing
the power of intermediaries, undermining
the 'natural monopoly rationale' for
telecommunication services orovision,
and favouring the 'message' over the 'medium'.
The content provided is becoming increasingly
crucial in the consumer's decision to oot for
one among several rival distributors, i.e.
intermediaries providing access to the carried
content. The room for growth of the content part
of telecoms is tremendous, since, according to the
Boston Consulting group, the larger part of the
telecoms market is still data-transport based. and
only a small part is content-based. The prognosis
need not be bleak for all distributors however.
First through alliances, which are an interesting
development though not the central topic of this
article, they can hope to diversify their business;
second, the key to survival and success will
be product differentiation - and technological
innovation provides opportunities for such
differentiation; and third, an eventual
consolidation in the marketolace should
ameliorate prospects for the survivors.
The multimedia information society (MlS) is
an all-encompassing concept that attempts to
capture an all-encompassing transformation.
The Information Society is a concept reflecting
the resultant of a series of developments on both
the demand and the supply side, centred around
the increasing ease, speed and affordability - for
technological as well as (de)regulatory reasons -
of manipulating data in various forms, through
increasingly efficient conduits/processors.
The concept encompasses the increasingly
interactive nature of the services and the
applications riding on them and providing the
added value that justifies the launching of such
conduits/processors; it encompasses the work of
tJte,J
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the builders of this infrastructure and of the
interacting users, producing and consuming
information. Last, but not least, the Information
Society concept entails the ubiquitous impact
on the socio-economic sphere of these
pervasive though Protean technoeconomic
developments, that not only change form
continually, but also reshape the social context
which gives rise to them.
The MIS network of networks, late 2Oth
century's Holy Crail, can be sketched out as a
multi-layered structure that will be based on
infrastructure providing access and connections
(optic fibre, coaxial, copper, satellite, radio,
microwave, etc.). This grid is the backbone of
the MlS. Service providers (public or private)
will have access to the grid, and will use it to
provide services (e-mail, teleshopping, tele-
education, telebanking, etc.) to their customers
who will be receiving information through the
grid. Application developers will be fashioning
new application packages for the network
which they will be able to sell to consumers
through the service providers.
ln order to assist us with the eventual
evaluation of prospects for various players in this
supernetwork one can project, for analytical
purposes/ the following production chain:
a) Content originators (artists, writers, movie studios, etc.)
b) Content packagers [V stations, cable channels, On-line service providers)
c) Gate-keepers at gateways to the network (navigation software; encryption specialists)
d) Distribution providers who owir the conduits to consumers (cable companies, telecom
operators)
e) Access devices (TVs, PCs, etc.)
fl End users
As mentioned above, this breakdown serves
analytical purposes; in practice firms are not
limited to one part of the chain. We will, for
simplicity, collapse the first two categories into a
large 'content' category, the last two into one 'end
usage' category and will not explore deeply the
otherwise crucial function of the gatekeepers,
which may develop into the most strategic and
attractive area of activity - unless ease of entry into
it undermines its profitability.
One of the clearest statements about the
emerging MlS, and its value/production chain
presented above, is that content will be
vindicated, in the sense that for a long time
ideas, creators, as well as the businesses that
marketed the products of human creativity, were
often at the mercy of intermediaries/distributors,
,J',J-JJ
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who controlled the means of access to the
public, in textual, audio, video, computer file,
etc. format. The distributor of the package
created by the content provider could often
dictate his terms on the latter, because it was
technically, legally or financially impossible for
the content provider to bypass the distributor or
assume the distribution task himself.
The transformation undermining the power of
the distributors is due to two factors. First of all, the
deregulation/liberalization drives over the last
decade have been undermining the privileged, and
often legally endorsed, monopoly position of
distributors, and have facilitated entry of new
players in the market for distribution/transportation
of information. The new players' basic market
penetration strategy has been to beat the
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deregulation and
technology are
undermining their
positton.. 
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prospects for content
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There is room for
projected growth in
the market for
content, since
distribution still claims
the lion's share
Entry in the content
industry has always
been easv (although
success has not)
incumbents on price, since in terms o{
infrastructure and coverage they are often, at least
initially, at a disadvantage. Furthermore the
captive market enjoyed by the monopolists, and
intricate settlements accounting schemes for
international calls/connections/transactions, had
led to heavy overpricing that left room for
newcomers to offer lower orices.
Second, and perhaps most important,
technological developments increasingly
undermine one of the basic pillars of monopoly
treatment of telecoms operators, namely the
natural monopoly character attributed to the
telecoms industry for a very long time. The fixed
costs of start up were deemed to be so high, and
economies of scale so strong, that it made sense
for the state to have one distributor and regulate it
(often through direct control/ownership). Falling
marginal costs for transmission, storage, retrieval,
and processing of information are questioning the
validity of such claims. The convergence of
telecoms with one of the most fiercely
competitive markets (information technology) has
further weakened the foundations of monopolistic
structures in the telecoms industry.
On the other hand, the increasing, and
increasingly affordable, information canying
capacity is leading to a proliferation of
intermediaries who are fundamentally in the
business of selling a 'connection' to a 'pipe', a
conduit (or parts of a conduit), In order for the users
to pay, directly or indirectly, for such connections
however, the content they will be receiving should
be attractive. Since the number of creative
producers does not seem to have kept pace with the
proliferation of intermediaries, there will be more
distributors chasing after the same (more or less)
number of content providers. To put it simply
whereas in the beginning magazines (content
providers) paid intermediaries in order to get their
publications on-line, they now sell their intellectual
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product to intermediaries - often dearly, as the recent
Microsoft deal with the NBC television network
showed. To avoid confusion note that large firms
such as Microsoft may have both content providing
parts as well as intermediary functions. In setting-up
its own on-line network Microsoft enters the
business of selling connection, of intermediating' -
not necessarily an optimal move as both its legal
troubles as well as its most recent Internet-espousing
commercial moves seem to indicate.
These developments in supply and demand
explain why 'content will rule' in the MlS, in the
sense that it will be at a premium, at least when
compared to its relative weakness in earlier times.
And there is room for restriking the balance in the
market in favour of content; according to the
Boston Consulting Croup, although the telecoms
market is worth more than 400 billion dollars, onlv
-50 are devoted to content, whereas transport of
information claims the lion's share - 
-260 billion
dollars (Le Soir, Dec. 2, 1994, p.6, Economie).
These numbers reflect the hitherto enviable
position of intermediaries/distributors. The
attractiveness of content benefits content packagers
in multiple ways, since they can exploit content by
repackaging it in various guises (e.g. movie, video,
soundtrack, t-shirts, etc.). Intermediaries, such as
on-line services may well suffer as the much
cheaper and more populous Internet becomes
increasingly aftractive; they may be forced into
lower profit margins and into selling connection to
the Internet, instead of competing with it.
The search for 'content' applications however
should not focus on entertainment; killer
applications may likely belong to the domain
business rather than that of entertainment through
(what ultimately boils down to) enhanced TV sets.
For instance, an emerging new service that
combines the electronic oresentment of bills with
the electronic payment of those bills promises big
,J,J,J5,J
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savings. Electronic Bill Presentment and Payment
(EBPP) systems eliminate paper entirely from the
billing/payment cycle as billers create electronic
versions of their statements directly from their
internal billing system. These electronic bills can
then be available to consumers over the lnternet or
another network. The consumer accesses a special
Web site, reviews individual bills, and schedules
them for electronic payment. This new combined
approach of electronic presentment and payment
promises to deliver the type of dramatic efficiencies
for billers and consumers that most people thought
were available only through electronic bill
payment. The potential cost reduction is dramatic:
An EBPP service provider that charges 35 cents per
bill to : million customers can save more than 92
million per year if only 10% of the biller's
customers convert to EBPP. In addition, EBPP can
remove four to seven days from the average billing
cycle, resulting in very sizeable savings for large
billers. Such savings potential will be a powerful
force for market expansion. ('Electronic Bill
Presentment and Payment: The New 'Killer App' in
the U.S. E-Commerce Market', Thomas F. Horan.
SRI BIP report D98-2135, 1998).
Note, however, that eventually the gap
between supply and demand and the high returns
enjoyed by and projected for content providers
(e.9. Microsoft, US film industry) will stimulate
others to join the content provision club, in order
to share in the good fortune of content providers,
and this would in the longer run bring down the
profit margins for content (at least for the less
creative content-packaging part). Furthermore
whereas telecoms, and in general the more
'hardware' oriented parts of the industry, could
enjoy some legal/regu latory/techn ical protection,
the more creativity-based,'software' oriented
activities have always had the lowest baniers to
entry. Note however that entry does not guarantee
success, especially in 'creative' industries, where
product attractiveness is notoriously hard to
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predict, where star performers receive huge
rewards, attracting masses of emulators which,
however, must survive on meagre rewards and
grand aspirations, hoping their time will come.
The very characteristics that make commercial
appeal unpredictable a priori for creative products
also shield these products against 'reverse
engineering' by competitors seeking to decipher the
elemental 'formula' for success, so that they can
then apply it themselves. The flip side of intellectual
products' resilience a6ainst'reverse engineering' is
their vulnerability with respect to sheer, crude
copying, to which they have fallen victim
throughout the ages. This points to one factor that
may taint the rosy scenario painted above for
content, and hence points to the importance of
adequate protection of intellectual propefty rights
for the full realization of the potential of content
provision, which is gradually being liberated from
the grip of distributors, as suggested above. The
recent emphasis on Intellectual Property Rights (lPR)
protection, is partly attributable to the fact that
European policy makers and entrepreneurs, as well
as their US and Japanese counterparts, increasingly
realize that high returns, and the comparative
advantage of the industrialized countries, lie with
knowledge-intensive activities, including intelligent,
flexible MlS-informed manufacturing, and not with
traditional mass manufacturing. In the lafter East
Asian - and other - competitors learn extremely fast
how to outsell their First World teachers.
There are a few hitches in the above scenario,
though not enough to undermine the validity of the
main argument. First, as mentioned already above,
the culture of the content industry and the fleeting,
character of product attractiveness -impossible to
pin down a priori to any particular formula or
characteristic- makes content a risky business, and
this preoccupies investors. Second, from a
macroeconomic perspective, since personal
disposable income edges up only slowly,
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The prospects for
distributors can be
mitigated through
product differentiation,
inter-industry alliances
and eventual
consolidation
expenditure would have to be displaced from cars
and houses, etc. in order to pay for content. lf
however consumer spending on leisure increases
then content should benefit. Finally, in the longer
run the dishibutors, currently competing among
themselves, and bidding up prices for content,
are likely to consolidate and limit content
providers' power.
This leads us directly to the second clear
proposition that is often heard regarding the MIS
value chain presented earlier. As already explained
above, diskibution is generally projected to suffer
from falling profit margins, due to technological
breakthroughs and deregulatory drives, that will
virtually turn it into a commodity business. ls the
future indeed that dire for distributors? Not
necessarily. The need for continuous technological
updating and the technological requirements of
high quality multimedia applications imply that
not all distributors will be offering the same
services. Product differentiability is the best
antidote to commoditization, and at least some
distributors may have the resources and capability
to differentiate (e.g. offering not mere telephony
but packages of services with special, even
custom-made features). The problem of course is
that if a large number of them are able to employ
this strategy, competition among them in a
globalized market will be fierce and the dire
prognosis presented above applies in equal
strength. lt is quite likely however that eventually
consolidation will improve prospects for the
remaining consolidated distributors. Nevertheless,
the high profit margins of days passed would be
hard to come up with, because excessive price
mark-ups will trigger market entry by new rivals
(since set-up costs are falling) as well as
competition by cellular, satellites, etc.
Finally in dealing with such challenges
distributors are both forming alliances and
sharpening their knives. They form inter-industry
No.26 Julv 1998
alliances (e.g. with content providers) to diversify
their activities, and to gain a friend while they
still have something to offer - market power,
access, assets, etc. before competition erodes
their attractiveness as partners. They also form
intra-industry alliances in order to benefit
from concentration, and to be able to
promise global end-to-end, hitchless, seamless
telecommunications, which can be a lucrative
market, especially with respect to business
customers. They also aim- through alliance
formation - to spread risk better, to enhance their
tactical advantage in the light of crucial
negotiations (e.9. world-wide satellite distribution),
to share costs of possible investments - or even
through advertising blitzes, to intimidate rivals, or,
defensively, to balance similar posturing by rivals
(it should be noted however that more than 60% of
such alliances fail within a vear).
In summary, technology and liberalization
are reducing the power of intermediaries,
undermining the 'natural monopoly rationale' for
telecommunication services provision, and
favouring the 'message' over the 'medium'. The
content provided is becoming increasingly crucial
in the consumer's decision to opt for one among
several rival distributors, i.e. intermediaries
providing access to the carried content. The room
for growth of the content part of telecoms is
tremendous, since the larger part of the telecoms
market is still data{ransport-based, and only a
small part is content-based. The prognosis need
not be bleak for all distributors however. First
through alliances, which are an interesting
development though not the central topic of this
article, they can hope to diversify their business;
second, the key to survival and success will
be product differentiation - and technological
innovation provides opportunities for such
differentiation; and third, an eventual
consolidation in the marketplace should
amef iorate prospects for the survivors. 5
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The Management of Intellectual
Propefty in Publicly Funded
Research
Pietro Moncada Paterno Castello, Jaime Rojo de la Viesca and
Eamon Cahill, IPTS
lssue: The successfut management of intellectual properw rights (IPRS) has emerged aS
an area of parflcular interest for all partners involved In collaboratlve research. The
sharlng of the tPRs derlvhg from publlcly funded research actlvlties ls a qulte sensltlve
issue; various conflicthg views exlst on how to share lPRs and their effect on the
potentlal commerclallzation of technology. Equallv lmportant for Research and
Technology Organlzaflonsl {RTOst ls the hplementation of clear strategles In thls area
whlch are unobstructed by managerial practices, restrictive legislation or aclministratlve
pollcy rules resultlng from cultural retlcence towards applled research and llmitlng ldeas
of public properry.
Rolevance: Although the prlmary purposes and raison d'ctre ot many publlc RTos ls non'
commerclal research, potenfially marketable R&D results may arlse incldentally anct may
deserve IPR protection. wlthh a new context characterlzecl by less government support
for R&D and Increasecl prlvate sector interest, the correct management of lntellectual
property ls ltkely to play a fundamental role both In the stimulatlon of the generatlon of
knowledge and lts translatlon Into economic and soclal beneflts.
lntroduction
urooe shows excellence in scientific
performance (as measured by number
of publications per unit investment)
but its technological and commercial
performance (as measured by patents issued per
unit investment) is low and even declining with
respect to its principal competitors (notably, the
USA and Japan). The ownership and exploitation
of rights in intellectual property are key factors
in determining the success of technological
innovations introduced in the market place and
provide the means for technological progress to
continue to be made and thereby support the
competitiveness of industry.
ln the case of RTOs, lPRs make it possible to
develop strategies for dissemination and transfer
in such a way as to maximize social welfare. The
efficient management of lPRs is crucial to
providing the right incentives for continuing
technological innovation. One of the major
opportunities brought in by technological
advance is the appearance of whole new
economic sectors and business opportunities for
t_JtJr
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value-added generation in European industry.
An efficient system has to adapt rapidly to the
challenges posed by a continuously evolving
technological environment.
This situation today is marked by the paradox
that market requirements drive industry to focus on
short term results whilst comoetitor nations are
making significant investments in science and
technology. In addition to traditional S&T areas,
there are many new areas of basic research which
are oriented toward supporting long term or social
needs. Others hold little prospect of short{erm
commercial application and therefore do not
comply with the return on investment horizon
expected by private firms. There is an identifiable
need to find the right balance between
fundamental research and target-oriented research,
and this issue is becoming even more important as
many areas move their centres of gravity closer to
users' needs and applications. Thus a management
culture is reouired which stimulates an
understanding of research-related lP issues. This
culture must also clearly signal the value placed by
the institution on the development of exploitable
results and the appropriate handling of the
procedures for protecting their results.
Intell€ctual propeily and the evolvlng
role of public funded research
The ability to conduct basic research that will
directly or indirectly provide overall benefit to
society represents the primary role, the essence
and the unique feature of publicly-funded
research programmes. Nevertheless, there is a
need to put in place the measures needed to
make this possible within the European research
system in a way that is more efficient than
it has been in the past. This entails the detection,
identification, protection, dissemination,
promotion and transfer the new discoveries that
result from these research activities.
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In the past, a large part of the public R&D
effort was primarily directed towards defence,
energy, and to a lesser extent public health,
education, and other social purposes. The lP
which resulted from these R&D investments
notably in the case of military/defence R&D, was
therefore fairly easy to control and manage.
Nowadays there tends to be a greater focusing
of public R&D on more socially-oriented
objectives, providing scientific results which
address citizens' major concerns (e.g. the
environment, biotechnology, health and life
sciences, social development & services) and
ensuring economic security & development
(which also includes favouring competitiveness)
and this trend looks likely to continue into the
future. In accomplishing these objectives, it should
be noted that the environment in which S&T
results originate is undergoing rapid and dramatic
change. This is another result of the internalization
of research and of the globalization of markets,
human resource limitations, privatization of
several public RTOs, etc. These are all factors
which could make the management of lP from
public funded research more difficult.
ln discussing the identification and protection
of discoveries, full recognition should be given to
the fact that marketable discoveries can be
considered to be an exploitable 'by-product' of
basic research (the fundamental purpose of which
is broadening the human knowledge-base) and
that public research institutes should pursue
programmes of research which are not primarily
aimed at developing targeted products.
However, research institute managers should
monitor/investigate these emerging markets and
evaluate the possible economic and social
benefits arising from technological innovations.
The granting of licences for the exploitation of
research results is a very sensitive issue. On the
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benefiting socieW as a
whole is an essential
feature of publicly
funded research
programmes
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-""s"Ao In the past, the
emphasis of publicly-
funded research on
defence purposes
made intellectual
property easy to
manage. Today, with
research being directed
towards a wider varietv
of social goals, the
issue has become
more complex
Competitiveness is
nowadays recognized
to come from the
ability of firms to
exploit innovation,
nowever, as
government funding
to R&D declines, an
intellectual property
framework promoting
private investment
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one hand, companies investing in a certain As the role of governments in R&D decreases, the
technology are interested in blocking their need for stronger private incentives augments and
competitors' access to the same knowledge and therefore stronger lPRs are needed to provide the
will request exclusive licences to develop a private incentivesforthecreation of new nowledge.
technology which incorporates risks and
uncertainties that are transfened to the company. Several initiatives have been launched at the
On the other hand, publiclyJunded knowledge Commission level to adapt the system to current
resources should be rapidly disseminated in order changes in the techno-economic environment.
to benefit the largest-possible share of society. Initiatives to support the completion of the
internal market also take intellectual and
centrality of lPRs in a changing techno- industrial property matters into consideration' An
economic environment example showing the centrality of lP matters to
the development of an emerging sector is the
The competitiveness of firms today is largely recent approval by the Council of Ministers of the
determined by their ability to capture the economic long-awaited Commission directive on the legal
benefits of scientific and technological innovations. protection of biotechnology inventions.
Th€ case of biotechnology
Because of the long-term investment horizon, the potential commercialization of biotechnology
inventions are onlybased upon the exclusivity given by patents. Public Research Organizations
cannot play a role in line with their mandate in this important (publicly sensitive) sector i{ they don't
patent inventions and do not provide companies with exclusive lP protection. In addition, the
general EU regulatory frameworVpatent system has been unfavourable to the development of
biotechnology within the EU and at present the USA holds 65% of the world patents in
biotechnology, while the EU only has |5% (European PatentOffice,lggS). Consequently, Europe
is becoming one of the best markets for USA biotechnology based products, instead of being a
competitor on an equal footing.
Regulatory initiatives to promote innovation
and European competitiveness in other
significant economic sectors will follow, as has
been indicated by the recent proposal of a
directive on copyright and related rights in the
information society and a debate has started on
the need to launch a directive on software
patenting. A stable framework definition for the
regulation of copyright and related rights as well
as protection of the new forms of technological
know-how - as software - is particularly
important if support is to be given to the new
added-value generation opportu nities brou ght on
the scene by the rapid development of
new technologies and systems, such as the
information society and electronic commerce.
Patenting new technologies provides - even in
the present highly competitive environment - the
most robust 'banier to entry'. Nonetheless, it has to
be mentioned that copying technologies is becoming
ever more frequent (De Kar*Silve1 1997\:
t 60o/o of all patented innovations are imitated
on average within four years
' 
The ratio of imitation time to innovation time is
on average 70%
ttt,J,J
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' 
The ratio of imitation cost to innovation cost
is on average 60 %.
This is one of the reasons why - where
applicable - companies could decide to protect
their discovery by other means (e.9. 'non-
disclosure' in the case of the Coca-Cola formula)
or not protect their lP at all (e.9. new technologies
with a very short life-cycle).
While it is clear that basic research performed
by RTOs acts as the reservoir of knowledge that
will enable the generation of new inventions,
there has been a drawing closer to more
application-oriented research. The EU 5th RTD
Framework Programme proposal clearly reflects
the recent trend towards more targeted science
and technology which has been experienced
world wide. This trend also responds to a
common series of observed facts; reduction of
government supported defence expenditures,
government willingness to balance budget
deficits, tax-payer interest in seeing how R&D
contributes to their well-beine.
At the same time industry, due to the
complexities of the technological processes and the
competitive pressures it faces, has expressed an
interest in establishing partnerships collaborations
with RTOs. All these facts contribute to explaining
why the management of lPRs has become a priority
in the strategy design and planning of an increasing
number of RTOs world-wide.
Efriclent Intellectual property
management In the technology
transfer processes
The process by which publicly funded
technological knowledge is transferred from
RTOs to industrial applications should be better
structured if adequate returns from public
investment are to be obtained. The emergence of
tt,Jt,J
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Technology Transfer centres associated with
publicly funded research institutions is one
of the new features of the organization of
research transfer.
Recognition for the researcher or inventor
responsible for an innovation is a key aspect.
Frequently, subsequent commercial exploitation
relies heavily on the input of this person to
the process of transferring the knowledge
to the industrial partner and throughout
the development process. The organizational
culture of RTOs must be such that the necessary
personnel arrangements in support of this phase
of the work (secondments, transfers, leaves of
absence, etc.) are smoothly introduced and in
such a way as to coincide with the interests of
all concerned. This transfer of'soft technology'
is the type of technology transfer most
needed by industry.
RTOs also need incentives to transfer their
inventions to commercial products. In the past
both the invention and the associated revenues
belonged to the government. This situation is no
longer true for many RTOs now that the system
allows a fixed amount of the royalties from
licences to go directly to the RTO to fund further
research activities. New formulas of rewards are
also being tested, an interesting example is the
recently launched initiative of the Heidelberg-
based European Molecular Biology Laboratory
(EMBL), which is the first international research
organization to take a stake in a venture-capital
company (10% of its shares) in exchange for
intellectual property based on its research
(Nature,5 February 1 998).
In general, public authorities do not claim
directly the ownership of lPRs which result from
publicly-funded research. Instead they delegate
the management as well as the dissemination and
transfer of the new knowledge to the RTOs.
Despite the existence
of patent protection
copying technologies is
becoming more
frequent. This causes
many companies to
resort to secrecy as the
most reliable means of
protection
The process whereby
publiclV-f unded
technology is
tran#erred to industrial
applications needs to
be better structured,
with greater individual
recognition and
smoother transFer of
personnel to and from
private industrV
New reward structures
for RTOs need to be
examined, such as
allowing them to
reinvest income from
licensed technologies
into further research
ffi
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In the US and Japan
publicly-f unded
research envisages
commercial
arrangements and
inanrnnr2toc fha
necessary management
procedures and lP
controls
In general, the
European lP protection
system could benefit
from simplification,
harmonization and a
reduction in the cost
of obtaining and
maintaining patents
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sharing of lP ln the RTD Framework Programme
The EU 4th RTD Framework Programme has incorporated not only strong provisions for the
exploitation and diffusion of results into its structure and regulations, but clear guidelines about the
ownership of the results in the form of lPRs. In general, it provides ownership to the contractior
when EU funds are less than 50% of the costs involved in the research while ownership is shared
according to the terms of the contract and use by either side requires public recognition and
acknowledgement of the contribution of the other. In practice it is not clear whether this affords
the EU the flexibility which each individual situation might require.
The commercial, exploitation of research results
from publicly-funded research institutions has also
been undergoing a gradual change in recent years
as a result of the increasing financial pressure
to obtain returns from oublic investment.
Considerable modifications to traditional practices
have been introduced and there is an apparent
convergence in practices world-wide. The United
States and Japan have had long-standing
commercial arrangements which include a
number of basic concepts which underpin a wide
range of flexible commercialization practices:
a) All publicly funded research activities have
clauses in established agreements which
envisage the sharing of lPRs from the
achieved results.
b) The management process for the research
projects include procedures for the
management of the resulting lPRs and for the
exploitation of results.
c) There are no restrictions on the rights of the
owners of the lPRs, including governments,
public bodies or their agents from entering into
commercial arrangements for the use of these
rights by others, provided existing laws and
general policies regarding public procurement
and contracting are complied with.
These findings derive from a brief study
performed by IPIS (Cahill, 1997) covering a sample
of case studies in the EU, Japan and the United
States involving public financial support for
research. In all of the identified case studies
there was a clear policy commitment directed
towards promoting the commercial exploitation of
discoveries and knowledge generated through
publicly funded research. The study also found that
excessive bureaucratic or administrative procedures
acted as constraints on the transfer of lP to industry.
On a more general basis, other factors which
will clearly facilitate the use of the IPR system
include the simplification and harmonization of
the lP protection systems in Europe (EC, 1997) and
also a reduction in the costs involved in obtainine
and maintaining patents.
Organizational management
& intellectual property
The cunent application procedure for both
patents and other forms of lP protection is both time
consuming and administratively cumbersome
and although many institutions have whole
departments dedicated to the task, it inevitably
constitutes a heavy burden on the research staff
involved. One possibility is to adopt a similar
option to the one existing in the US system, which
permits the filing of provisional patent applications
at one-fifth the cost of a conventional oatent
application while preserving the date of invention.
This permits RTOs to expand a search period for
identifying potential licensees for their technologies
before applying for the conventional patent.
t,JtJt
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Management of lPRs in the us system
The US system has a longertradition in the process of dissemination, transfer and utilization
of Federal Technology than the EU. The most relevant pieces of US legislation covering
aspects relating to lPRs in RTOs include:
o Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, focused on the need for
dissemination of information requiring federal laboratories to take an active role in
technical co-operation and establishing the Offices of Research and Technology
Application and the Centre for the Utilization of Federal Technology.
r The Bay Dole Act of 1980, permitted universities, non-profit research organizations and
small business to obtain lPRs covering inventions developed with governmental support
and also allowed government-owned and government operated laboratories to grant
exclusive licences to patents.
r Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, established a principle of royalty sharing for
federal inventors, introduced technology transfer as a responsibility of all federal
laboratory researchers and an aspect to be considered in the evaluation of the performance
of laboratory researchers.
The government, according to US legislation, can provide exclusive or non-exclusive licenses
on government-owned inventions and requires that a major portion of the royalties revert to
the laboratory.The law also gives preference to Small Businesses when granting licenses. The
potential licensee should equally present plans to commercialize the technology. Nelsen
(1998) has found support for the positive effects deriving from RTOs licensing activities
enacted by the Bay-Dole Act. In particular, positive effects were found in terms of business
start-up and lob creation in the development and manufacture of products resulting from
university licences. Networking of federal laboratories is also possible under the US system.
The Federal Consortium for Technology Transfer in the US comprises over 700 research and
development federal laboratories and provides a forum for the development of strategies and
opportunities for linking government technologies with the market place.
The US system has lately focused in the development of public-private partnerships in order
to transfer the lPRs from public laboratories or universities to industry. The Co-operative
Research and Development Agreements (CRADA) aim to improve the commercialization of
RTo-developed technologies by creating synergies and working closely with industry.
According to Nelsen (1998) allowing academic institutions and small companies to retain
ownership of inventions from federally funded research has unequivocally fostered the rate of
patent applications by RTOs.
'JJ,JJO IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1998
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A cheaper provisional-
patent system would
allow RTOs the time to
identify potential
licensees for their
technology before
filing for a full patent
RTOs could learn
from the way private
companies organize
product management
through dual technical
and customer liaison
facets
A specific office within
RTOs responsible for
handling lP issues
would allow the
process to be made
selective, avoiding the
loss of credibility that
indiscriminate filing
might cause
The design of incentive mechanisms that will
guide researchers' efforts to obtain lP rights for
inventions and discoveries is a fundamental
aspect. In many research institutes, advancement
is based primarily on publication procedures and
the system does not envisage the possibility
of implementing reward schemes aimed at the
inventor. Altogether, the existence of separate
units, within the institute facilitates the
identification of research results for exoloitation
possibilities that may have gone unrecognized.
The costs of obtaining and maintaining a
patent portfolio are relatively high, therefore
criteria that permit the selection of the
technologies for protection are necessary. Equally
important for the exploitation of results is the
identification of a market for RTO output. The
most obvious and best known market for any RTO
is that of its partners in sponsored research. These
companies can also provide contacts to their
supply chains and customers. The more difficult
areas are in sectors with which the institutions
may have little or no previous experience of
contact. In these cases they might have to rely on
the services of intermediaries such as technology
transfer agencies or venture capital companies. In
many countries in Europe such agencies form part
of the array of publicly funded organizations that
make up the industrial development and support
network, particularly for SMEs. An interesting
example is the European network of Innovation
Relay Centres funded by the European
Commission, which acts as a clearinghouse for
supply and demand of technologies available for
exploitation throughout Europe.
Many private companies supplying products
and services which are of standard types and
which are subject to frequent modifications
organize themselves in such a way that each
product (systeml family has a product manager
who represents the technical specification facet of
July 1998
the product over its life-cycle and a customer
liaison manager whose orientation is guided by
the customer specification facet of the same
product. The customer liaison manager harnesses
the customer/user inspired innovations for the
supplier company. RTOs could undoubtedly learn
valuable lessons from this approach.
The existence of an office in the organization
responsible for the management of intellectual
property allows a process of identification and
discrimination in the process. Not everything
that can be patented or protected should be. For
instance, the indiscriminate filing of provisional
patents in the hope of licensing them after 12
months or using them as bargaining chips in some
other transaction can debase the whole process
and damage the reputation and credibility of the
institution with its potential industrial partners.
concluslon
lPRs - and the way in which they are
disseminated and transferred- are likely to
become an increasingly important topic for the
competitiveness of European industry, and they
have a role to play in helping RTOs exploit the
results of their research which may be
commercially exploited (although this is not the
central aim of their research). The trend towards
reduction in public support for R&D, and the
urgency of translating innovative R&D results
effectively into commercial goods and services
will be probably be offset by a larger involvement
of the private sector in R&D activities. For
these reasons a redefinition of the role and
management of lPRs within RTOs is necessary.
The fruitful exploitation of lPRs deriving from
publicly funded research requires the full
introduction of managerial and organizational
practices and attitudes that enhance the
generation and rapid commercialization of
technological knowledge.
No.26
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Several issues identified in this article can
facilitate the smooth transfer of the knowledge
generated in RTOs to the private sector in
the form of lPRs:
o Providing the necessary incentives and
rewards to the individuals who generate the
Invenuons.
Introduction of new types of contractual
arrangements that permit RTOs to capture the
benefits from their inventions -e.g. taking equity
in start-up companies as a form of royalties.
Providing partial or exclusive licences to firms
interested commercializing the technology.
Focusing awareness by disseminating information
to the private sector on the technological
knowledge held in the form of lPRs.
Promote technology partnership arrangements
with the private sector.
Cuarantee a clear definition of the lPRs that
may result from research activities.
Where applicable, and without compromising
the public character of RTOs, learn from
private sector approach, orienting research at
an early stage of development.
Develop mechanisms to identify technologies
with commercial impact and pursue lP
protection for them.
Thus, summarizing, in the past the results of
basic research were freely disseminated and
public-domain knowledge predominated, but
nowadays as the complexities and the costs of
the innovation process have increased, industry
and tax-payers want to see a more direct impact
of public funded research on their socio-
economic well-being. In this context lPRs have
acquired a central position as the mechanism
that facilitates the transfer of knowledge
from RTOs to the market and therefore
to society at large. f
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1- Research and Technology Organisations (RTO) include public research laboratories and universities
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Social Technology Foresight:
The Case of Genetic Engineering
0. Todt and J.L. Lujan, University of Valencia
lssue: The acceptance of products ancl research programmes by wider society ls
becomhg a key factor for thelr success. Avolctance of soclal reslstance anct lts assoclated
costs can be an lmportant lssue in research ancl development In the genetic engineering
fleld. Any developments In technology that do not sufficlenfly take hto account the
preferences and values of dlfferent socfal groups can lead to conflld, as shown by recent
debates over the pfoducts of genetic englneerlng.
Rel€vance: Declsion making ln technology pollcy can be Influenced by the poslttons
taken by dlfferent groups in soclety. Understanding these positions and taklng them Into
account during policy or project design could help to lmprove the effectlveness of
research programmes and technology development projects. soclally oriented
technology foreslght coulcl provlde lmportant hformatlon for steerlng pollcy and overall
technology development towards socially accepted goals. thereby avoiding confllct.
Introduction: Social Technology
Foresight
his article makes the case for a technology
foresight strategy that actively integrates
different social values and obiectives. First,
a short analysis of some aspects of the
social debate surrounding the introduction of
genetically engineered food products into the
European market will be presented. The
importance of non-technical issues for the
technology's acceptance will be demonstrated.
Based on this, some of the advantages and
limitations of the involvement of social groups in
foresight will be discussed.
Foresight as an exercise in analysing future
technological options and their alternative paths
J''JJ
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of development over the mid- and longterm
could benefit from social involvement. Social
Technology Foresight, as understood here,
would be a foresight strategy which actively
involves all potentially affected social
actors (representatives from non-governmental
organizations, consumers, etc. in addition to
experts from industry or government) in:
o The definition of the (social, economic,
political, environmental, etc.) objectives
of technology policy.
o Mapping out the alternative future paths
of technology development and their
implications (especially their acceptance
by society).
o Determining a normative framework for the
foresight exercise, and contributing to the
social shaping of technology: technology
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Social Technology
Foresight, as
understood here,
would be a foresight
strategy which actively
involves all potentially
affected social actors
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Social Technology
Foresight would run
parallelto social
involvement in
technology
assessment, but rather
than concentrate on
particular applications,
would cover whole
technological areas
Social Technology
Foresight would be an
iterative process,
starting with
identification of the
actors and deFinition of
the objectives and
culminating in the
drafting of a report
development (and policy) here is understood
as an active and conscious orocedure
oriented towards certain desirable social and
economic objectives (Todt, 1997).
Social Technology Foresight, in this sense,
has to be seen as running parallel to social
involvement in technology assessment (TA).
However, TA with social participation has been
concerned more with questions concerning the
development of concrete applications of a given
technology. Participatory TA has only in part
tried to convert broad-based and organized
participation into a general and fundamental
base for policy development for future overall
technology strategies. On the other hand, a few
preliminary attempts at broadening the social
base of national foresight programmes already
exist (for instance: Ceorghiou, 1996). However,
the social involvement has remained very
limited, and subject to an overall expertise-
centred approach.
The general process of Social Technology
Foresight would be iterative. lt would take place
concurrently with, and as a fully-integrated part of,
regular foresight activities, following these steps:
1) identification of the actors concerned,
2) definition of the objectives of the foresight
exercise by all participants,
3) treatment of the issues and elaboration of
alternatives futures and policy options by each
actor-workgroup,
4) debate with all the actors of the different
proposals (workshop-style meetings),
5) drafting of a report.
The present debate in many European Union
member states on genetically modified organisms
(CMOs), i.e., plants or animals developed
by genetic engineering techniques, highlights
the role that social groups can play in
technology development. Especially the recent
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confrontations on the issue of labelling of
transgenic foods (i.e., food products made from
CMOs) demonstrates the susceptibility of certain
technologies to public critique. Social groups
which were not directly involved in the
development of a technology but are affected by
it (as in this case, certain consumers) can
successfully resist the adoption of that technology
if they feel their demands were neglected during
the technology's development.
Genetlc Engineerlng and the Public: The
dlfflculty of characterizing public
attltudes towards blotechnology
Public perception of genetic engineering:
What do the industry and the public institutions
know about the public attitudes toward
biotechnology? Numerous studies on public
perception can serye to answer this question
(Zechendorf 1994; Biotechnology and the
European Public Concerned Action Croup
1997; Davison, Barns & Schibeci 1997). The
conclusions show ambivalent attitudes toward
this technology. Let us look at some examples
from a Spanish study.
lmportant differences appear among the
ethical valuations, perceptions and attitudes
toward the consumption. For example, when the
Spanish population was asked for a general
valuation of the applications of the genetic
engineering to different organisms; 56% agreed
with applications relating to plants, and 25% with
the applications relating to human cells.
However, only the 39% of interviewees would be
willing to consume potatoes genetically modified
to be more nutritious, while 57% would be
willing to undergo a genetic diagnosis, and 70o/o
to gene therapy (Atienza & Lujiln 1997). The
general valuation and the attitudes are different.
This example is indicative of the kind of problems
studies on public perception face.
.JJ,JJ-J
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Social lnfluence on the Development of
oenetic Engineering
While studies of public perception are not
sufficient to describe social attitudes to a
technology accurately, the public does
nevertheless exert an influence on technology
development. Two examples of important areas
for social factors having an impact on a
technology's success are:
a) the social debate on the technical
characteristics of the oroducts (and their
impacts),
b) and the influence of the debate about
secondary characteristics of the products, like
labelling.
al The Debate on Herbiclde Resbtant crops
(HRCsl and Other olilo Products
Herbicide Resistant Crops (HRCs) are among
the first products based on genetic engineering
techniques to enter the market. They are plants
that have been made resistant to a specific
herbicide, so the application of the herbicide on
the field does not damage the crop, but only the
weeds in the field. The debate on HRCs like soy
beans or maize started because its critics
contended that these crops would have negative
environmental impacts, and might lead to
increased herbicide use. To date, no conclusive
scientific study on the overall long{erm effects
of these plants exists.
However, the groups critical to genetic
engineering were successful in their opposition to
HRCs in several EU member states because of an
under-appreciation of the benefits to consumers
of these plants (while some consumer groups
might face perceived possible environmental and
health risks). Other factors that favoured the critics
were scientific uncertainty about the long
term effects of these plants. The debate about
,J ,J ,J ,J ,J
@ IPTS - JRC - Seville. 1998
uncertainties persists, among other reasons,
because publicly financed specific risk
assessment research on a number of issues which
have been pointed out by the critics (like gene
transfer to wild relatives of some genetically
modified plants) were only put underway when
the overall debate on CMO products had already
started, and not before.
This example shows how the negative social
perception of a technology can endanger
successful application if questions important to
that technology's consumers (like the relation
between costs and benefits or environmental
effects) are not adequately addressed during its
development. Examples from other technologies
show the dangers of not addressing possible
problems from the outset. The social dimensions of
nuclear powet for instance the question of nuclear
waste, were not addressed during research and
development of nuclear technology. A social
foresight exercise upon which the development of
an overall energy strategy was based before the all-
out development of that technology might have
pointed out possible problems and alternatives
(obviously, only if the situation in society had been
the one we find today).
b) lhe labelnng debat€
Even though labelling genetically modified
food products is not an issue directly related to the
technical development of these products, it has
turned out to be a major social issue that is
currently affecting the markets for these products
in many EU member states. The debate on what
products to label, and how, has lead to even more
uncertainty on th€ consumers' side. lndustry has
been affected by the discussion of the possible
complete segregation of CMO and non-CMO
products during production. Labelling has even
been one factor in creating markets for non-
genetically modified products in some European
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Debate on the
characteristics and
impacts of products
and a retlection of this
debate in the form the
products take te.g.
labelling) are important
factors for acceptance
The case of herbicide
resistant crops shows
how lack of perceived
beneFit with which to
offset real or imaginarv
fears can result in
products being
strongly opposed
by the public
Aspects which are
secondary from a
technological point of
view, such as labelling,
may nevertheless
prove to be crucial
social issues
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Different trajectories of
development for the
same basic technology
may meet with
differing degrees of
,aaonfrnao nrsvevvLsr rvv vl
resistance, and
organized debate earlv
on may highlight which
directions are more
sociallV acceptable
Clearlv the process
needs to be adequately
managed to prevent it
becoming excessively
complex and slow. lts
credibility also has to
be protected by
ensuring it does not
become the vehicle of
public relations
exercrses
countries. Labelling is an example of a
'secondary' social aspect of a chosen
technological path. Even though it is not a
technical characteristic of the technology or
product, it could be as important as any technical
feature for the success of a given alternative
foreseen technology development strategy.
A Social Foresight strategy
The conscious and organized debate on issues
related to future R&D-strategies with all the
affected groups could give important insights into
what directions of technology development could
be socially more acceptable, and which technical
or non{echnical aspects might create rejection.
Different development trajectories for the same
basic technology can have very different levels of
social acceptance. This is the reason, why overall
society (and not just the most vocal groups)
should become involved at a very early stage, to
inform policy-making about the acceptability of
different alternatives. Foresight with the
involvement of all social actors, especially the
ones which tend to ouestion the current lines of
development of technology together with those
who tacitly approve of them, could provide a
wider base for decisions when choosing among
these alternatives. For each alternative, it would
give the following information which would
reduce the uncertainty regarding its social,
political and economic effects:
o Level of social acceptance/rejection of each
alternative future technology policy path, and
social resistance to be exoected.
Identification of non{echnical ('secondary')
issues which might condition a chosen
alternative and create social problems in the
implementation of that technology paths.
ldentification of related research (beyond
the specific technological development)
for each alternative path to avoid possible
social problems.
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. lssues on which close contact would have to
be established between developers and wider
society during the development process.
Among the potential drawbacks of this process
are its inherent complexity, costs and slowness.
One of the most difficult challenges would be
making the process efficient and self-organized by
the participants themselves. Efficient management
would be crucial, and this includes active
moderation of the discussions. The process does
not need to lead to a consensus on all ofthe issues:
even a clear definition of the social oroblems in
relation with policy options from the point of view
of each actor, or a oartial consensus on a number
of questions would give valid input for policy
making: a clarification of which negative social
impacts (if any) could arise. However, if the actors
do not reach a minimum of consensus in a sensible
time frame, the foresight exercise could lose its
usefulness for all actors involved in policy-making.
One of the conditions for making the process work
is avoiding its abuse for simple public relations (PR)
purposes by any ofthe actors. This, however, could be
assured precisely by an open and public process: all
of the acton (industry NCOs, etc.) are under sufficient
scrutiny by the general public in today's society that
any strategy centred around PR instead of solving the
problems is likely to become apparent.
Social foresight could benefit both industry and
public policy making. For policy makers, at stake
are the efficiency of public investments
in technology development, and the social
acceptability of their management of technology
development for society's good. Social foresight
could help to avoid the public questioning of
technology policy, which happens invariably
when technologies developed with public R&D
assistance create controversy (as happened in the
case of genetic engineering). lt would also help
to ensure the effectiveness of public R&D
,J,J'J-J
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programmes by guiding industry towards socially
acceptable developments. In addition, based on
such a foresight strategy, research projects
concerning the social problematic of contested
technologies could be defined. One of their aims
would be to investigate what scientific evidence
would be necessary to clarify the social debate on
the technology in question. Another outcome of the
process would be information on future regulatory
needs. Regulation could then be devised in
parallel with the technology development itself.
This would give all actors, especially industry a
stable framework from the outset.
For industry, the value of Social Technology
Foresight would a greater concentration on the
specific applications of a technology. Within the
overall framework set by a public foresight exercise,
industry could use this strategy to define acceptable
uses for a given technology, as well as product lines.
The main use of this strategy for public policy-
making would therefore be in the first phases of the
process, in the definition of overall technology goals
and social and technical objectives. For industry it
would become important in a later stage, for the
more detailed foresight of specific technologies.
Naturally, the involvement of social groups
would not supplant the existing foresight
methodology, rather, it would complement it to
improve its effectiveness in particular cases.
Moreover, social participation would remain
limited to certain areas of foresight, particularly the
definition of the objectives of future technology
policy and the identification of alternative
development paths and their social aspects. As the
experience with genetic engineering has shown,
this kind of foresight could help in particular by
making all those involved aware of benefits as well
as the costs, and so lead to the establishment of
alternative development paths with high social
acceptance in the case of technologies identified
beforehand as critical, and that can be expected to
have a wide-ranging impact on society. f
o
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It is widely perceivec
that technology is
constantly contri butin g
to improving welfare
and creating jobs,
reducing employment
onlV during crisis
situations when rapid
change upsets existing
patterns
lssue: The role of technology acgulsltlon in existing companles In terms of Job creaflon
ls controverslal, especlally In mature Industrlal sectors. However, ln less-favoured
reglons (LFRS) technology can be usecl as a tool for economlc development and job
creation. Howeven one problem ls access for SMES to funds that Will help them obtaln
up-to-date technology.
Relevance: In order to increase the efflciency of the Industrlal Innovatlon ancl reglonal
clevelopment publlc support programmes, the conflnuous improvement of
management procedures is necessary. The correct selectlon of beneflclary companles,
matchlng project scope with thelr needs and the speedlng up of support mechanlsms
should be the maln goals. Local management of a transnational technology transfer
programme (e.g the TRANSTEX moctel) can be very efficient in terms of employment
and competltlveness, showlng a way from whlch valuable lessons for a wldespread
dlssemlnation mlght be learnt.
Technology as a Keyfor Employment and
Development
L. Crespo, CEX
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Factor
Regional
Macroeconomic policies, regardless of the
theories on which they are based, tend not to
address regional problems effectively (Si{nchez, P.
'I 997). However, one basic macroeconomic idea
remains useful; that regional development is only
possible if the local companies sell more and
obtain greater profits.
When and how do neu, technologies
have a positive net employment
impact?
Looking at the issue from the perspective of the
macroeconomic approach alluded to above, any
increase in regional CDP will basically depend on
The ambivalent relationship between
employment and technology
f t has come to be a widely held view that asI
I well as being a fundamental characteristic of
I humankind, technological knowledge makes
I a constant contribution to welfare, increased
output and, correspondingly, job creation. Only,
in periods of crisis, when radical innovations are
being introduced rapidly, may the situation
appear otherwise. This may well appear to be the
case in some regions when assessing the potential
influence, unpredictable to some extent, of the
information and communication technologies on
the future model of our society.
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increased sales by local companies. However, in
the existing global market, these sales will in turn
depend on the competitiveness of the companies
in the region.
Competitiveness is often based on the use of
modern technologies for the production of goods
and delivery of services, and therefore the higher the
level of the technology, the more possibilities there
will be to increase market share. Nevertheless,
while success is not guaranteed for all companies
that try to bring their products and processes up to
date, difficulties are certain for those who do not.
However even in terms of employment, the
fact that a company increases its sales does not
automatically mean more jobs, as increased
competitiveness is normally associated with a lower
ratio of labour per unit of product. Therefore the
implementation of technological innovations will
only have a global positive impact level in a given
region when the increase in sales compensates the
associated unit reduction in labour content.
From this schematic description the complexity
of the problem is clear. The number of possible
combinations and particular cases depends on the
specific characteristics of the regions and the
business sectors. lt is no surprise then, that there is
a major debate about the role of new technologies
on the development of LFR (Crespo, 1., Mogoll6n,
R., 1996). The importance of local management
is reflected by Regional Policy Commissioner
Monika Wulf-Mathies comment that "regional and
local representations in particular are to be much
more involved in the planning, implementation
and monitoring of Structural Funds".
A short cut: the TRAIIISTEX model
The TRANSTEX project was conceived after
the shared insight by European Commission
D.C.s Xlll and XVI that intelligent, direct
'J,J,JTO IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1998
promotion of technology transfer to Objective 1
Regions could result in positive development
and employment impacts.
The funds (1 million ECU) came from the
Article I0 framework of ERDF and represented
50% of the total project costs, (the other half
being financed by the receiving companies). The
project lasted for'l B months and was also formally
supported and supervised by the Regional
Covernment.
The Corporacion Empresarial de Extremadura
(CEX), a partly publicly-owned investment
capital firm, was. pleased to act as Operating
Agent for this project which consisted of
the implementation of advanced European
technologies in five openly selected companies in
Extremadura. CEX assumed the responsibility for
reporting to the E.C. acting as beneficiary for the
financial aid and as subsequent distributor to the
companies according to prior, jointly-defined
rules, clearly stated in the contractual conditions
between the E.C. and CEX.
The company profiles and project scopes of
the five TRANSTEX sub-projects are given in the
box below.
All the five sub-projects were completed on-
schedule, within budgetary limits and the
expected technical results were obtained. The five
companies were able to solve specific problems
through technology acquisition, and were
subsequently able to offer new products on the
market or to substantially improve their production
processes. This has resulted in a significant sales
increase and the direct creation of around I00
new jobs. Recently a financial control mission
from the Commission checked the technical and
contractual aspects ln slfu and it included highly
favourable comments on the achievements and
management of the project in its report.
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The bottom line for
regional development
is that if a region is to
develop its companies
need to sell more ano
generate more profit
In a global market this
depends on their abiliW
to compete
Competitiveness
depends upon using
technologies so as
to enable greater
production to be
obtained from the
same or fewer
resources, As this
normallV entails less
labour per unit, jobs
will only be createc
if sales increase
proportionallv
h the TRANSTEX
project the
Corporacion
Empresarial de
Extremadura acted
as an intermediary
between the European
Commission and the
SMEs receiving funding
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As well as supporting
traditional sectors,
TRANSTEX enabled
companres to move
into new ones
Successful
microeconomic
development projects
depend on selecting
the right firms, flexible
funding management
and responding
to real needs
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- Agro-food company producing dried products. By implementing new British technology, it
achieved a reduction of the level of impurities, which allowed it to supply to new customers
and markets.
- Slate company. 8y installing Swedish extraction equipment it was able to put into operation a
high added value quarry producing a type of black granite which is unique in Europe.
- Consumer goods production and catalogue sales company. By installing advanced Cerman
automated shirt production equipment it was able to start competing against Asian
manufacturers and include its own shirts in iG sales catalogue.
- Agro-food company producing and marketing cherries. By introducing a special British-made
film the company's cherries can withstand longer periods in the special packages without
degradation, allowing them to be exported to more distant countries and improving its offer on
the national retail market.
- Muttimedia company. By acquiring French microchip card and Cerman CD-ROM technologies
it was able to offer advanced application projects in the region and in the rest of Spain.
The TRANSTEX project was also in harmony
with the regional development strategy as it not
only supported well-established sectors (agro-
food and ornamental rocks) but also broadened
the range of goods supplied by the region (textiles)
and introduced new business activities (microchip
cards in this case).
As a summary of the project, the E.C.
contributed 1 million ECU, Extremadura imported
2 million ECU-worth of know-how and advanced-
technology equipment from northern European
member states and Spain is saving around
1 million ECU per year in unemployment subsidies
no lc'nger required thanks to the 100 new jobs.
Reasons for Success
Public policies in the field of technology
transfer to companies must meet the following
criteria in order to be successful:
o Selection of the right firms.
r The project content should respond to real and
immediate needs.
. Agile mana8ement of aid funding.
Although these criteria seem obvious, it is not
easy nowadays to find public support programmes
where the three criteria are fulfilled simultaneously.
Furthermore, the chances of achieving them
decrease when one moves from local to national
cover and even more from national to European
level. However, this is not an impossible task as the
TRANSTEX project has shown.
Before starting to present the lessons learnt, it is
essential to mention that in order for future actions
of this kind to be sound there is a basic need to
respect the subsidiarity principle. That means that
the E.C. should be involved only when its role is
necessary and complements the role of the relevant
Administration, at national or regional level.
J-J,J,J,J
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It is clear that in this project this criterion was
fulfilled. In particular, in all of the five TRANSTEX
companies, the contacts between receiver and
provider firms would have never occurred
without European-level intervention.
But there is another important piece of added
value at European level to be mentioned. Both
regions, the supplier and the recipient ones,
benefited from the same single subsidy. This is,
therefore, a good example of fruitful actions
aiming to promote North-South co-operation
within Europe, and one which also might
be taken as a reference for Third Country
support programmes and, especially, for the
Mediterranean and Latin American regions.
A brief description of the fulfilment of
the success criteria by the TRANSTEX project
is given below.
Selocting the rlght flrms
Firstly, the programme has to get the
necessary credibility to stimulate the firms to
participate. Cood firms (which also exist in
Objective 1 even though they are not regular
clients of the European innovation programmes)
do not like to waste time answering calls for
proposals. This procedure usually takes a long
time to be evaluated and requires prior
negotiations in order to arrive at a trans-national
team which can be put forward, moreover the
chances of being selected are perceived as being
very slight. In addition, having a good project
is not enough. The firm and its current
circumstances are also relevant and this is hard to
assess at a distance.
These requ irements were automatical ly fu lfi I led
in the TRANSTEX model when the firms were
visited and given the relevant information (besides
the publicly available information) at their own
,J ,J ,J ,J ,J
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premises. The companies knew that a prestigious
local organization, CEX, was acting as the
intermediary for European financial aid, that this
aid had already been received, and that their
proposals would not have to be evaluated
thousands of kilometres away. Therefore they could
enter into negotiations with the foreign supplier
optimistic about their chances of being selected.
It is crucial to bear in mind, however, that if this
methodology were used widely forthe management
of public support programmes, the concern over
how to protect the process against "favouritism"
would have to be given considerable thought.
The Operating Agent (O.A.) should be willing
to take on considerable responsibility with regard
to the financing institution. lt certainly helps
if the intermediary is a public or semi-public
organization with control mechanisms already
built in to it. Although this should not prevent a
private company from becoming an intermediary.
Publication in the regional or European official
journals might be carried out to demonstrate
publicity but the only practical way to promote
participation will be the direct contacts between
the O.A. and the companies.
The financing institution should be prepared to
receive and study potential claims from companies
that could have presented proposals and which
were not chosen by the O.A. The O.A. must clearly
assume its own responsibilities, not only at the
selection phase but at the implementation phase as
well, but the involvement of selection or programme
control commiftees might reduce agility.
Achieving a prolect matched to the
beneficlaries' needs
CEX did not define the thematic project lines.
Its only role in this respect was to assure a a
spread of projects and companies among sectors
The IPTS Reoort
It is quite clear that
European level
intervention was
appropriate for this
project, as without it
the receiver and
provider companies
would have never
come into contact
Targeting the right
companies is made
difficult by the fact that
SMEs in LFRs believe
proceoures are
complex and time
consuming and that
they have little chance
of success
A local Operating Agent
is able to target
companies in the
region more eftectively
as it can combine its
local knowledge with
the credibility given by
EC backing
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Application for normal
subsidies requires
a great deal of
preparation, and
subsidies do not
normally exceed
2O% of the total
investment. Using an
intermediary simpl if ies
and speeds up the
process, which is
particularly important
for SMEs
in line with Regional Covernment industrial
policy (assuming a strategy at that level exists),
without forcing project contents at all. The
companies selected for themselves the
technological innovations they considered might
help overcome their problems. They also knew
that a quick, on-the-spot decision would be
given, rather than have to undergo a lengthy
wait for a bureaucratic process, at the end
of which their circumstances would probably
have changed. lt also helps in general if
technological/economic intelligence principles
are also used to define a short-to-medium
term strategy.
In the general case it should be possible to
translate the company's strategic objectives into
clearly defined added value, which could be
linked to a measurable gain for the company in
terms such as product characteristics, increased
productivity, decrease in process costs, etc. This
clearly identifies the need for the use of suitably
defined oerformance indicators.
Achleving agile management of funds
Company participation on a 50% basis
normally means in effect that the company has
to support 100o/o o{ the costs for what can be
a lengthy period. This fact, along with a long
drawn-out proposal evaluation period, normally
implies that the project does not run as
initially planned and that the cost statements
will generate work for the financial controller
at the Commission.
The current situation with respect to the ERDF
aid (participation in the last framework
innovation programme was negligible) to SMEs in
objective I regions, no matter whether they are
for conventional fixed assets or technological
ones, is the following: 2 months for preparing the
dossier (a consultant is normally required due to
No.26 July 1998
the complexity for optimizing the subsidy
and the whole procedure); 7 months for receiving
the approval communication, although the
corresponding implementation period could run
somewhat in parallel; 3 months between the
execution and the approval of certified costs
and, finally 12 more months until the money is
received. Innovation programmes at European
or national level do not provide ouicker
schedules either.
Moreover, the current subsidies within the
regional incentive programmes hardly exceed
20% of the total investment, while it used to be as
much as 40%. Under European rules TRANSTEX
was able to provide a 50% subsidy.
In this respect the intermediary (CEX in this
case) negotiated directly with the company
and met the contractual partial payment
commitments immediately after the company
had paid the total milestone cost to the supplier.
This payment was never delayed more than one
week and in some cases both payments, i.e. to
the supplier and to the recipient companies
(50%), were made simultaneously.
Concluslons
This pilot project has shown, above all,
the great innovation potential that exists in
Objective 1 Regions and which is often
unexplored by European Innovation Programmes
owing to the difficulties of promoting the
participation of SMEs from LFR in these
action lines.
Moreover it underlines how a decentralized
management model can obtain participation
from SMEs which, under normal circumstances,
would have never benefited from this kind
of support. Additionally, awareness of the
companies' needs and proximity to them, can
JJ.J,JJ
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ensure that project funds are really applied where
they are effective, i.e. to the projects with the best
guarantees of obtaining the hoped-for positive
socio-economic impacts.
Another important conclusion is that
business people involved in innovation
programmes of this kind are in general aware of
their own companies' technology needs. They
are usually kept informed by trade fairs,
suppliers and by keeping an eye on their
competitors. This might imply that studies of
demand, diagnosis, etc., do not always provide
real added value in preparing the actions and
may even in some cases be a hindrance to the
participation of SMEs.
Nevertheless, as has been mentioned, the
TRANSTEX project was a pilot and, of course, its
management model for public support can not be
automatically extrapolated, for instance, to the
management of the Innovation Action Plan.
Moreover the lessons learned in the TRANSTEX
project might help Regional Administrations to
understand the great impact on employment and
economic development that technology transfer
programmes might have.
The accent on the transnationality of such
programmes is sufficient justification for the role
of the European Commission, either through the
innovation funds or through the regional
development funds. f
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The IPTS Report
The IPTS is one of the seven institutes of the Joint Research Centre of the EU Commission. lts remit
is .the observation and follow-up of technological change in its broadest sense, in order to
understand better its links with economic and social change. The Institute carries out and co-
ordinates research to improve our understanding of the impact of new technologies, and their
relationship to their socio-economic context.
The purpose of this work is to support the dee ision-maker in the management of change pivotally
anchored on Sfi developments. In this endeavour IPTS enjoys a dual advantage: being a part ofthe
Commission IPTS shares EU goals and priorities; on the other hand it cherishes its research institute
neutrality and distance from the intricacies of actual policy-making. This combination allows the
IPTS to build bridges bewen EU urtdertakings, contributing to and co-ordinating the creation of
commbn knowledge bases at the disposal of all stake-holders. fhough the work of the IPTS is
mainly addressed to tfre Commission, it also works with decision-makers in the European
Parliament, and agencies and institutions in the Me-mber States.
The Institute's main activities, defined in close cooperation with the decision-maker are:
I
1. Technology V/atch. This activity aims to alert European decision-makers to the social, economic
and political consequences of malor technological issues and trends. This is achieved through the
European Science and Technolqgy Observatory (ESTO), a European-wide network of nationally
based organisations. The IPTS is the central node of ESTO, co-ordinati;rg technology watch 'joint
vehtures' with the aim of better understanding technological change.'
2. Technology, employment & competitiveness. Civen the significance of these issues for Europe
and the EU institutions, the technology-employment-competitiveness relationship is the driving
force behind all IPTS activities, focusing analysis on the potential of promising technologies for job
creation, economic growth and social welfare. Such analyses may be linked to speci{ic
technologies, technological sectors, or cross-sectoral issues and themes.
3. Support for policy-making. The IPTS also undertakes work to supports both Commission services
and other EU institutions in response to specific requests, usually as a direct contribution to
decision-making and/or policy implementation. These tasks are fully integrated with, and take full
advantage of on-going Technology Watch activities.
As well as collaborating directly with policy-makers in order to obtain first-hand understanding of
their concerns, the IPTS draws upon sector actors' knowledge and promotes dialogue between
ttrem, whilst working in tlose co'operation with the scientific community so as to ensure technical
accuracy. In addition to its flagship IPTS Report, the work of the IPTS is also presented in occasional
prospective notes, a series of dossiers, synthesis reports and working papers.
The 1PTS Reporf is published in the first week of every month, except for the monihs of Jonuory ond August. li is edited in English
ond is currently ovoibble ot o price of SO fCU per yeor in four longuoges: English, French, Germon ond Sponish.
New telephone snd fqx numbers
The Europeon Science ond Technology Observotory Neiwork (ESTO):
IPTS - JRC - Europeon Commission
W.T.C., lslo de lo Cortuio s/n, E 41Q92, Swillo, Spoin
tel.: +34-95-448 82 97; [ox: +34'95-448 82 93; e'moil: ipts-secr@irc.es
. ADIT - Agence pour lo Diffusion de l'lnformotion Technologique - F
. CEST - Centre for Exploitotion of Science ond Technology - UK
. COTEC - Fundoci6n poro lo Innovoci6n Tecnol6gico - E
r DTU - University of Denmork, Uriit of Technology ,Assessment - DK
. ENEA - Directorote Studies ond Strotegies - |
. INETI - lnstituto Nocionql de Engenhorio e Technologio lndustriol - P
. ITAS - Institut fur TechnikfolgenobschciEung und Systemonolyse - D
. NUTEK - Deportment of Technology Policy,Studies - S
. OST - Observotoire des Sciences et des Techniques - F
. SPRU - Science Policy Reseorch Unit - UK
r TNO - Centre for Technology ond Policy Studies - NL
. VDI-TZ - Gchnology Centre Future Technologies Division ' D
. VITO - Flemish Institute for Technology Reseorch - B
. VTI - Group for Technology Studies - FIN
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